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Using extensive interviews of Syrian activists and tracing the course of initially peaceful 
protests, this article explores the mobilization tactics protesters adopted over four 
distinct phases of Syrian protests up to August 2011. Analysis reveals that in 
establishing trustful relations and a sense of effectiveness and belonging among the 
protesters, interpersonal communication was more effective and faster than the hybrid 
media activities of Facebook administrators. Nevertheless, the uprising’s later stages 
show that the more protesters became accustomed to protest culture, the more they 
benefited from ICTs. Many scholars studying ICTs’ role in the protests have advanced 
the idea that people’s use of the technology—not the technology itself—affected social 
processes. This study takes this argument a step further to claim that people’s use of 
technology constitutes a dependent variable linked to the country’s political culture.  
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In March 2011, after showing remarkable endurance under the Assad regime for many years, 
Syria witnessed the biggest uprising in its history. Inspired by Egyptian and Tunisian protesters, 15 
schoolchildren in the provincial town of Deraa drew antigovernment graffiti on the walls of a school. They 
were arrested by the Moukhabarat (intelligence service) and their fingernails were pulled out. The local 
representative’s humiliating words toward the children’s parents galvanized the town’s clans, and within 
three days, the people of Deraa took to the street. While protesting, a few were shot dead (Leenders, 
2012). The violent death of peaceful protesters was a particularly catalyzing factor that instigated local 
protests around Syria. Like Tunisians and Egyptians, many Syrians mobilized to gain their freedom by 
pushing their long-standing dictator and the Moukhabarat out of office. From the start, however, the 
regime’s very effective use of repression and a hybrid media system led to divisions among the protesters. 
Some eventually took to arms to thwart violent reprisals against opposition groups. Over four years, the 
uprising turned into more than a battle between the opposition and forces loyal to Bashar al-Assad, 
drawing in neighboring countries, world powers, and extremist groups, including the Islamic State (“Syria: 
The Story of the Conflict,” 2015). By August 2014, the UN attributed more than 191,000 civilian deaths to 
the conflict, demanding urgent international and national action (“More Than 191,000 People Killed in 
Syria,” 2011).   
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The Syrian uprising also differed from protests in Egypt and Tunisia in its mobilization process, as 
the Internet did not become the Syrian protesters’ main organizational hub. Commentators have 
emphasized that analysis of the role of ICT in protests needs to take into consideration the nuanced social, 
political, and communication structures that were unique to each Arab country (Anderson, 2011; Castells, 
2012; Howard & Hussain, 2011; Khamis, Paul, & Vaughn, 2012). Khamis et al. (2012), for instance, 
compared cyber activism’s roles in the Egyptian and Syrian uprisings and found that political and social 
factors unique to each country affected the process of the protests, such as the degree of state pressure 
on the protesters, interference by the international community and the military’s response to the 
protesters. Meanwhile, the two countries’ differing media structures affected their communications. Syria, 
unlike Egypt, limited coverage of the events by banning foreign journalists, with few exceptions (Khamis 
et al., 2012). The aim of this study is not to identify all the structural factors differentiating Syria from 
other Arab countries, but to understand which factors affected the use of ICTs during the protests and 
what their role in the Syrian collective action was. Angelis (2011) explored the network society of Syria in 
2011, arguing that in contrast to Egypt’s well-developed Internet community, the Syrian Internet space 
was formed only after the protests erupted in Syria, by newly active and disconnected actors mainly 
operating from abroad. Consequently, Internet activism seemed incapable of either guiding the protests or 
offering a platform on which opposition members could negotiate a unified political position. This article 
develops Angelis’ argument using in-depth interviews with an administrator of the Syrian Revolution 2011 
Facebook page (SRFP) and Syrian protesters on the ground. These interviews reveal the communication 
techniques the protesters used to organize and mobilize the protests. Their responses also illuminate how 
and why particular ambitions and techniques resonated in their various local contexts.  
 
This research’s first critical finding is that Syria’s political culture significantly impacted the use of 
ICTs in the protests. Acquaintance with the country’s political culture before the uprising is vital to 
understanding this relationship. Given Syria’s turbulent political development after independence, Syrians 
generally preferred to distance themselves from political activities that could cause instability and chaos 
(Lesch, 2012). The regime’s attempts to create cultural mechanisms of control, such as a “cult of 
personality” around the president, further shaped Syrian political culture (Weeden, 1999). Although people 
did not necessarily believe the “mystifications” advanced by the regime, they were required to obey (Crisis 
Group, 2011). In the 1990s and 2000s, the Internet and satellite TV channels took on an informative role 
in Syria, creating a much more interactive and engaging political space (Lynch, 2006; Shaery-Eisenlohr, 
2011). Anderson (2013), who did ethnographic fieldwork in Aleppo from 2008 to 2009, found that the 
cultural mechanisms of state control were no longer effective. People weary of the corrupt, patriarchal, 
nepotistic system adopted a narrative of scorn and lament that not only mocked or castigated political 
figures but also drew attention to their failings (Anderson, 2013).  
 
Despite Syria’s increasing political awareness, the culture of obedience remained influential there 
until the 2011 uprising began. The interviews for this research reveal that Syrians followed these norms 
initially because they lacked protest experience, and subsequently because the Syrian security state’s 
structures of enforcement and coercion deterred them. Caroline Ayoub, for instance, a Christian Syrian 
from Damascus detained by the Assad regime in 2012 for her civic engagement, stated:  
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Before the revolution in Egypt, people were allowed to gather, had political parties. . . . 
People were exposed to political life. In Syria, we were away from politics. Our parents 
used to tell us that we shouldn’t talk with anyone about our religion or about politics.  
 
Syria’s limited political space and political culture, which ran through families, restricted the 
protest capacities of the youth. Apart from the few Syrians who had been politically active before the 
protests, such as members of the civil society movement, Syria lacked an experienced community capable 
of organizing a solidly structured protest movement. Other than regime-sanctioned protests on foreign 
issues, since the 1980s Syrians had witnessed only a few protests in Kurdish regions in 2004 (Kurdwatch, 
2009). The regime had also fettered and repressed the civil society movement that emerged in the 2000s 
and played a controversial role in the manipulation of Syrian culture (Cooke, 2007).  
  
To activate a public used to living in a culture of obedience, it was paramount to first create trust 
relations among potential participants and establish a sense of causality and belonging. This analysis 
shows that the administrators of a Facebook page were unable to implant these notions with only two 
weeks of preparation. Old communication methods and the expertise of experienced activists with 
preexisting ties to different segments of the public more effectively and rapidly built togetherness and 
trust relations among participants.  
 
This study’s second finding is that the eruption of protests in an authoritarian state can initiate a 
transition from a coercive culture of obedience to a protest culture prioritizing tolerance over conformity, 
autonomy over authority, and participation over security (Welzel & Inglehart, 2008). Such a transition had 
taken place in Egypt when the Egyptian uprising began (Colla, 2012; Tufekci, 2014). In Syria, however, 
despite the efforts of intellectuals in the 2000s, the cultural transition mostly occurred in 2011. Clearly, 
the more people got used to protest culture, the more they benefited from hybrid media and built 
transnational public networks. 
  
To gain a more nuanced perspective on the role of ICTs in collective action, this study first 
explores collective action theories long emphasized by social movement theorists. The literature review 
clarifies what collective action requires and whether ICTs can meet these needs. It also analyzes research 
on the role of ICTs in the Arab Spring protests. Second, it provides a brief background for the 
methodology used in this research. Finally, by presenting interviews with Syrian activists and tracing the 
course of the peaceful protests, the analysis details the use of ICTs in four different stages of the uprising. 
 
The Role of ICTs in Collective Action 
 
Social movement theorists have long sought to understand how individuals become involved in 
collective action. Resource mobilization theorists, such as Olson (2002), have argued that protesters 
rationally estimate the costs and benefits of taking action. To hinder free riders among protesters, Olson 
advocates that leaders either coerce by punishing those who fail to participate, or offer incentives to those 
who act in the group interest (Olson, 2002). Conversely, political process theorists like Tilly (2006) and 
Tarrow (2011) emphasize the role of political opportunities and constraints in the emergence of 
“contention.” According to Tarrow (2011), contention arises when dissidents, forbearing to comply with 
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restrictions, obtain external resources and discover opportunities to use them. Although these theorists 
clarify the factors that trigger collective action, they do not generally explain how a movement can sustain 
itself over time (McCaughey and Ayers, 2003). New social movement theorists, such as Melucci (1996) 
and Taylor and Whittier (1999), examine this issue and stress the importance of agency, collective 
identity, and loose network structures for the sustainability of protests. Collective identity has been 
defined as both an action and a notion (Melucci, 1996, pp. 72–73). First, it enables social actors to act as 
unified and delimited subjects. Second, it helps them build a notion of causality and belonging. Hence, 
participants feel that they are all working towards common goals. They also have defined opponents and 
an integrated sense of being that is incorporated into movement ideologies (McCaughey & Ayers, 2003; 
Melucci, 1996).  
 
Recent use of ICTs controverts the collective action theory of social movement theorists (Bimber, 
Flanagin, & Stohl, 2005). Emerging technologies make communication less costly, difficult, and time-
consuming; and it is no longer limited by individuals’ cognitive constraints (ibid.). The rapid flow of 
messages from one messenger to potentially millions on the Internet reflects the way new communicative 
forms can reduce the role of social movement organizations and leaders in the mobilization process. 
According to Castells (2010), transborder network communication is key, since it helps expand societal 
bonds by assisting the formation of weak ties with strangers. Weak ties have been crucial for mobilization 
processes, as they are conduits whereby collective action reaches larger numbers of people and travels a 
greater social distance (Granovetter, 1973). They have also been important in creating sentiments such as 
togetherness and led to the construction of a “network society” (Castells, 2010, p. 348). Gerbaudo (2012), 
developing this theory, proposed that the emotion of togetherness did not arise via spontaneous 
communication on the Internet, but rather was harnessed by the new “soft leaders” or “choreographers” 
of digitally enabled protests. Still, whether ICTs help to foster collective action and create the sentiment of 
togetherness among Internet users, and whether these technologies always extend people’s political 
capacities are questions that need to be analyzed in different contexts. So far, researchers’ responses to 
these questions have been diverse. Cyber optimists like Garrett (2006), Rheingold (2002) and Shirky 
(2009) praise ICTs for enhancing protesters’ ability to undertake collective action by removing barriers to 
group action. Cyber pessimists such as Morozov (2011) have warned of the risks of using these 
technologies in collective action, arguing that social media sites have in fact been used to reinforce 
dictators and threaten dissidents.  
  
In the wake of Arab uprisings, debates over the role of ICTs in mobilizations for political and 
social change intensified (Papadopoulos & Pantti, 2013). At first glance, these technologies appeared to 
have played a central role in facilitating political change. They gained attention for providing new sources 
of information that a regime could not easily control (Niekerk, Pillay, & Maharaj, 2011). Based on surveys 
of Egyptian protesters, Tufekci and Wilson (2012) also found that ICTs positively shaped how citizens 
made individual decisions about participating in protests. However, these early studies drew criticism for 
not considering the different roles of different media technologies and for overemphasizing technologies’ 
role in the protests. Multiple researchers who had conducted interviews with protesters started arguing 
that the online sphere was simply a tool for off-line protests (Aouragh & Alexander, 2011). Moreover, 
what brought success was not the technology but the political actors (Khamis et al., 2012). Adapting the 
resource mobilization theory to the Egyptian case, Eltantawy and Wiest (2011) found that the impact of 
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ICTs relies on the influence of outside conditions and the actors’ efficacy in utilizing available resources to 
meet their goals. The Egyptian actors used ICTs effectively, so the Internet helped them receive and 
disseminate information, build strong ties among protesters, and increase interaction among activists.  
 
Studies on Arab uprisings have explored more than the role of ICTs during protests. Hofheinz 
(2011) criticized the literature’s narrow focus on media revolutions and examined long-term cultural and 
social effects of ICTs to assess their part in the formation of a movement. Howard and Hussain (2013) 
also assessed cultural and social effects of ICTs in the Tunisian and Egyptian protests, finding that activists 
who built solidarity networks used ICTs to identify collective identities and goals in the preparation phase. 
Similarly, Herrera (2014) conducted interviews and analyzed the Internet activities of youth in Egypt, 
finding that as Egyptian youth interacted with each other online, they developed a virtual intelligence by 
sweeping away taboos, desacralizing icons, and freeing their minds. Hence, Internet use in Egypt opened 
cultural frontiers, broke down boundaries, and shattered taboos (ibid.). However, as Rinke and Roder 
(2011) pointed out, everyday use and appropriation of ICTs vary among cultural contexts. Cultural forces 
both enable and restrict the impact of ICTs. Focusing on the mobilization process in Syria, this study will 
build upon these theorists’ work by illustrating the symbiotic relationship between ICTs and the political 
culture. This research demonstrates that even as Internet use affects the culture of a country, political 
culture affects the way the Internet is used in collective action. Political culture may also complicate the 
creation of loose ties via the Internet and hinder the activities of soft leaders. 
 
Methodology 
 
Given the need to understand protesters’ experiences in both the online and off-line spheres, 
their personal tactics for organizing or mobilizing protests, and the way they used ICTs, this research 
relied on semi-structured interviews to shed light on the collective action process in Syria. The study 
adopted a method similar to that of Papadopoulos and Pantti (2013), who conducted 10 semi-structured 
interviews with Syrian diaspora activists to explore their media practices. Interviews for this research were 
conducted with 21 protesters who helped organize protests in either the prerevolutionary period or the 
mobilization period of the protests and with three journalists who worked in Syria during the uprising. 
Conducted in Istanbul, London, and Cairo in 2013 and 2014, the interviews lasted 60 to 90 minutes. The 
interviewed activists reflect the ethnic diversity of the Syrian opposition, mirrored also by their 
backgrounds in different cities that hosted peaceful protests in 2011: Daraya, Deraa, Damascus, Tartus, 
Latakia, Homs, Hama, Idlip, Saraqeeb, Deir-Ezzor. Most participants’ surnames are not given for safety 
reasons, and two participants are identified with pseudonyms at their request. The interviews were 
structured around six questions: Did the activists have past protest experience? How did the activists hear 
about the protests and get involved in the collective action? What was their aim in joining the protests? 
How did they organize or mobilize the protests? How did they get their news during the uprising? How did 
they use the Internet or other communication methods, such as face-to-face communication and mobile 
phones? 
 
To enrich data from the interviewees and reflect on the case studies in a broader perspective, this 
article also refers to secondary data gathered from mainstream news about Syria, monitored online 
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reports, academic articles on the Syrian uprising, human rights reports, citizens’ reporting (e.g., Syria 
Untold1), and the websites of the opposition (e.g., the local coordination committees’ website). 
 
Tracing the course of the protests and conducting interviews helped to identify four phases of the 
peaceful protests analyzed here: (1) experimentation, during which the administrators of the SRFP 
struggled to spark widespread protest using ICTs and TV channels; (2) local protest, in which contextual 
factors such as the presence of experienced activists, social networks, protest culture, and shared 
grievances helped foster a sense of togetherness; (3) diffusion, as mobilization began in new protest sites, 
in this case mosques, with the help of experienced activists’ networks; and (4) organized collective action, 
in which the nascent protest culture helped drive the formation of transnational public networks.  
 
The Experimental Phase: Led by Facebook Administrators 
 
As in the Egyptian revolution, the seeds of the Syrian protests were first sown on the Internet. 
Inspired by Tunisian and Egyptian protesters, three Syrians outside of the country decided to take action 
for Syria and launched the SFRP, a Facebook page titled “The Syrian Revolution 2011.” Operating online, 
they did not need to reveal their off-line identities. Even today, four years since the beginning of the 
uprising, one administrator, Mahmoud, still prefers to stay anonymous and uses an alias in interviews. 
When asked why he preferred to use an alias outside Syria, he stated: 
 
For security reasons. . . . It is not only about Syrian intelligence, but also about all 
intelligence agencies around the world. If the intelligence agencies know your identity, 
they will not allow you to stay in their country. Many Syrians got deported because of 
that, so we have to protect our identities.  
 
Except for one spokesperson, Fida’ad-Din Tariif as-Sayyid, the other administrators also adopted 
the same precautions Mahmoud took. In Syria’s unsafe environment, the Internet arose as the only 
platform permitted to operate anonymously against the state. It also provided a new platform from which 
the public—in this case as members of the Facebook group—challenged public authority. As the activist 
Suhair Atassi pointed out, Syria has long been a “kingdom of silence” (Wikstrom, 2011). In the absence of 
political or social alternatives to the Ba’ath Party, online activists used the platform of the Internet to 
counter this culture of fear. 
 
The SRFP also played an informative role, releasing information on the time and location of 
protests planned for February 4, 2011, in Syria. The interviewees described this call to action as a very 
courageous and shocking act. As the Syrian dissident Bilal, for instance, who while living in Damascus was 
detained by the Assad regime in 2011 for his online posts, mentioned: 
 
Before the revolution started, there had been a trial in February. There was a call for a 
protest from the SRFP. When I saw the first online post, it was a shock. The first thing I 
                                                 
1 See www.syriauntold.com 
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did was show it to my family. I said, “Look what is going on” and then, there was this 
silent moment. 
 
Bilal’s words point to the country’s long-reigning obedience culture. Seeing a call to action that 
directly challenged the authorities initially surprised Syrians and caught their attention. However, fear of a 
potentially oppressive response from the regime kept them from immediately responding to this call. Like 
Bilal, many other interviewees reported emotions of shock and surprise. Some, like Nada (alias), an 
activist from Tartus and employee of the online opposition radio station Radio Souriali, expressed 
suspicion: “When I heard the first call for protests, I thought this could be a ruse by the Syrian security 
services and that it might not be real.” 
  
Thus, although staying anonymous helped the administrators to operate safely, it prevented them 
from earning the public’s trust. Syrians skeptical about the credibility of the page hesitated to respond 
promptly to the call to action. The SRFP administrator Mahmoud indicated that TV and print media 
coverage was crucial to the page’s prominence and increased membership. He said: 
 
In the first two weeks, we were writing things like “please help us to reach 5,000 
people.” We kept writing this post, some brave-hearted people invited their friends and 
we got support from other Arabs. When we got 5,000 likes, a lot of media outlets 
noticed our page and started to write about it. Within three weeks, we became like a 
star and everybody heard about the page.  
 
Mahmoud’s words illustrate the enduring significance of traditional media in convincing people of the 
credibility of social media. Television channels that look into mediating stories from inside Syria became 
the mediator between the public and the SRFP administrators.  
 
Despite recent developments in ICT capabilities, in 2011 Syria’s telecommunication infrastructure 
was the least developed in the region. Internet penetration was just 23%. Although phone penetration 
was notably higher at 63% of the population, the number of 3G users had reached only 80,000 by the end 
of 2010 (Freedom House, 2012). Organizers relied on TV channels to reach non-users of Facebook. As in 
the Burma Campaign UK, whose growth is due to the power of a Facebook group and the BBC, the 
interconnection between the Internet and broadcast media shaped the evolution of the SRFP (Chadwick, 
2013). These data show that with regard to information dissemination methods, developments in Syria 
resemble those evident in western countries. 
 
Despite administrators’ intensive efforts, nobody turned up to answer the call for collective 
action. This failure had many causes. According to Ribal Al Assad, the date chosen for the protest and the 
pictures used on the page created doubt in minds of the public. The administrators chose the date to 
invoke the Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Hama in 1982. The SRFP also featured a picture of a clenched 
fist with a red color suggestive of blood, which was like calling for a civil war (Ribal Al Assad, in Lesch, 
2012). Moreover, certain segments saw the religious language in the administrators’ posts as an attempt 
to incite sectarian hysteria (Nabki, 2011). As the administrator Mahmoud explained, 
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we used religious language without any sectarian intent; we just wanted to 
communicate in the everyday language of the Syrian people. We later referred to a 
consultation board about the content of our messages, but it was a challenging process, 
as the consultants did not always respond quickly.  
 
One main reason for the public mistrust was that the SRFP was not founded until January 18, only a few 
weeks before the protests erupted, which was not enough time to build trust in a platform that was new to 
the public and had only one conduit between the administrators and the public—the spokesperson, Fida. 
Hence, the wrong narrative choice, a restricted time period, and the administrators’ security anxieties 
contributed to low attendance at the protests.  
 
Citizens’ reluctance to attend these protests supports theories of diffusion and mass 
communication studies that claim that people rarely act on mass media information unless it is 
transmitted through personal ties (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). The administrators had not established 
personal ties with the society, so the Internet by itself was not sufficient to convince people. As Castells 
(2012) has maintained, overcoming fear, which is fundamental to individuals’ participation in collective 
action, requires creation of an emotional mechanism of togetherness. The administrators could not build 
such societal ties in the limited time between the start of preparations for the protests and their ignition 
date. Additionally, most Syrians in Damascus lacked protest experience. Here it is crucial to remember 
that the logic of collective action entails relational structures, the presence of decision-making 
mechanisms, the setting of goals, circulation of information, calculation of outcomes, accumulation of 
experience, and learning from the past (Melucci, 1996). The Syrian protests lacked such factors as 
accumulation of experience and learning from the past. Without past protest experience, Syrians preferred 
to wait for others to take the first step. For instance, Mazen Gharibah, an activist and journalist from 
Homs, told me: “My friends and I attempted to go to the protests, but then a couple of us said that no one 
was going and that it was very dangerous, so we did not go.” Mazen’s words underline Syrians’ 
inexperience when it comes to protest. Off-line activism brought many challenges, and without a well-
organized group unified around a notion of causality and belonging, dissidents were afraid to take the risk 
of protesting against the oppressive Syrian state. 
  
A final factor stifling the spark of protest was the absence of experienced activists. Mahmoud said 
that what the administrators actually needed to organize protest in central Damascus was the support of 
experienced protesters. His arguments illustrate the limited capacities of “soft leaders,” in this case the 
administrators, in the organization process. Fear of the security services and the absence of effective 
opposition meant the organizers could not rely on hybrid media tools to mobilize people but also had to 
draw on the dynamics of collective action by finding leaders on the ground. 
 
The failure of the first Internet-organized protest compelled the SRFP administrators to include 
additional methods in their repertoire of contention, defined by Tilly (2006) as the subset of tactics people 
employ to make claims against powerful others. Thus they benefited from traditional methods like face-to-
face communication with experienced activists. Mahmoud claimed that 
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we once more called for protests on the 15th of March. We said that we were not going 
to wait for someone but that we would find this person. Thus, we began to communicate 
with activists and told them “you should go!” I had never been in jail, not even for an 
hour. I could not imagine myself in jail. Experienced activists did not know such fear 
because they had spent 15 years in prison.  
 
Mahmoud’s words support the validity of Olson’s collective action theory in the digital age. While taking 
action, protesters consider the rational estimate of the costs and benefits of action. Experienced activists 
ready to cope with the possible results of protests initiated the spark in the off-line sphere. They also 
encouraged others. Thus, the March 15 protests, organized via cooperation between the administrators 
and experienced activists, became the first planned protest against the regime in Syria, calling for 
democratic reforms and the release of prisoners (“Syria Protests,” 2011). Until then, Syrians had 
witnessed only spontaneous protests (Foreign Policy, 2011). Various media channels, including the BBC 
and Al Jazeera, covered the March 15 protests. Protest videos circulated on YouTube. Yet analysis showed 
that attendees numbered only about 50 (“Protesters Stage Rare Demo,” 2011). 
 
If the SRFP played any part in the emergence of the Syrian uprising, it did so particularly as the 
first public platform to encourage the public to take action. The administrators’ initiative was immediately 
taken as an example. On March 16, approximately 150 experienced activists and relatives of political 
prisoners gathered in front of the Interior Ministry to request the release of political prisoners (“Middle 
East unrest,” 2011). The seeds of the uprising had been sown. 
  
The Phase of Local Protest via Social Networks in Deraa 
 
Unlike the March 15 protests, the Deraa protests, which succeeded in bringing millions to the 
streets, were not planned. Leenders (2012), who explored the dynamics and underlying conditions of the 
Deraa uprising by analyzing digital sources and contacting activists on the ground, drew attention to the 
dense social networks in Deraa. Clans, labor, migration, cross-border movements, cross-border trade 
between Deraa and Jordan, and crime, Leenders argued, had led to well-established social networks in 
Deraa that proved vital to the successful mobilization of the uprising. Hence the appearance of the 
protests in Deraa was not a coincidence. Collective identity, which social movement scholars like Melucci 
have long emphasized as a driving factor in protests, was already present in Deraa.  
 
Apart from the city’s close social networks, two other distinct factors differentiated the Deraa 
protests from the March 15 protests. First, the Deraa protests ignited spontaneously against the brutal 
repression of the regime, mediated by overlapping social networks built over years. The public witnessed 
the arrest of children and the deaths of peaceful protesters. This serious violence and threat triggered 
outrage that gave way to widespread protests. In contrast, the March 15 protest was not responding to a 
political constraint or provoked by an immediate act of repression or threat coming from the regime. As 
the media researcher Enrico de Angelis asserted:  
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The Facebook page of the Syrian Revolution 2011 was made on nothing. It was not 
dedicated to a specific person either, like the “Kullena Khaled Said” Facebook page of 
Egyptian revolution.  
 
The administrators had difficulty activating people’s emotions in the absence of an iconic figure or specific 
event that carried profound emotional power, as had the death of Khaled Said and the torture of children 
in Deraa (Herrera, 2014). 
 
The other distinction between the Deraa protests and those in Damascus was the Deraa 
protesters’ past experience with protests. The experienced activist Osama, for instance, drew attention to 
the significance of past civil movements to mobilize citizens. Osama was among experienced activists who 
demanded the release of political prisoners in the March 16 protest in Damascus. When the Deraa protests 
began, he organized protests in his hometown of Daraya with the future martyr Giath Matar, well known 
for handing soldiers flowers, who became a symbol of the peaceful protests. When asked how they had 
succeeded in breaking down people’s fear and activating them in Daraya, Osama answered: 
 
The situation in Daraya was suitable for these things because, in 2003, there was a civil 
movement there against corruption and the invasion of Iraq. So, the atmosphere was 
ready, and the people were prepared for the demonstrations. At first, there were almost 
50 young men who went to the protests. Then, the protests became bigger and bigger. I 
had some friends who were arrested in 2003 in those protests and then released after 
two and a half years. They had big roles in mobilizing people in 2011. 
  
Osama confirmed that past collective actions had an important role in the 2011 uprising. The 
physical presence of experienced activists and their dense social networks helped form and sustain a 
collective sense of “we-ness” more rapidly (Earl & Kimport, 2011). This connectedness also encouraged a 
particular trust among the people that was closely related to the participants’ motivation. As their 
motivation intensified, the mobilization process accelerated (Granovetter, 1973). For example, when asked 
what motivated people to participate in the Deraa protests, Dr. Nasser Hariri, a Deraa cardiologist and 
representative of the Revolutionary Movement in the town of Horan, emphasized the close bonds of 
Deraa’s citizens, claiming that: 
 
Deraa was the last city that French occupation had reached and it was the first city that 
French occupation left. The people of Deraa have a specific culture. They have strong 
ties. Our humanity, our feelings, our honor are important. 
 
Consequently, the factors facilitating people’s collective action, such as a repertoire of contention, 
social networks, cultural frames, and collective identity (Tarrow, 2011), already existed in Deraa. These 
factors produced confidence in the participants. When the government’s attempted repression reached 
intolerable levels, well-developed social networks helped citizens forge solidarity with the parents of the 
tortured children. 
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The Diffusion Phase: Friday Rallies Led by Experienced Activists 
 
In parallel with the Deraa protests, demonstrations took place in three other Syrian cities—
Damascus, Homs, and Banias—on March 18 (The New York Times, 2011). Yet the diffusion of the protests 
occurred mostly on March 25, dubbed the Friday of Glory by the SRFP administrators. These protests 
brought thousands of Syrians into the streets in at least a dozen cities, including Homs, Hama, al Tah, 
Jableh, and Latakia, as well as in the towns surrounding Deraa and Damascus (Free Syrian Translators, 
2012). 
 
The leading activists in these cities took the initiative to organize and mobilize the protests. As an 
experienced activist from Daraya, Osama and his friends were among the leaders mobilizing the crowds. 
When asked what they did to mobilize people in Daraya, he answered: 
 
We were concerned about the security forces, so we only used our mobile phones to plan 
meetings. We did not say anything on the phone. We discussed things face-to-face when 
we met. We formed circles of five people, and then each circle tried to mobilize people. 
After creating big numbers, we gathered in the mosques. Later on, we went to the street 
and started chanting our slogans. People who saw us followed us, but the core groups 
were formed by circles of five people. This was because of security concerns. 
 
Osama’s words show that the mosques eliminated the organizational and logistical issues that a social 
movement organization would have encountered. The protesters did not have to put themselves at risk by 
showing up alone in the protest area. Starting the protests at mosques helped people discover they were 
not alone and spurred them to run the risk. The mosques became new protest sites where people 
gathered and felt deep-rooted feelings of solidarity. 
 
Meanwhile, the high number of security agents throughout each segment of society meant that 
Syrians had to adopt unique methods for the mobilization process, such as separating into small groups 
and communicating with people they already knew. Meziane, a leading activist from Hama and software 
engineer for Syrian National Council media, explained that “most people were afraid to go to 
demonstrations with people they did not know. They might be from the security forces. So, we did this 
with the people we knew.”  
 
In line with Granovetter’s theory (1973), the protesters developed weak ties that later 
transformed into strong ties as they met friends of friends. Granovetter argued that individuals who lack 
weak ties are unlikely to effectively mobilize in collective action within their community, as weak ties 
create more bridges between people (Granovetter, 1973). To form the necessary ties, the core group split 
into smaller groups, and each member of a small group brought a friend to the protests. The consequent 
snowballing effect enlarged the protesters’ numbers. Social networks that had developed over years of 
local dissidence played an important part in this process. Turkish reporter Hediye Levent, who has worked 
in Damascus for many years, gave an interesting example of how such communication networks 
developed: “The best news source was people themselves; you could hear what happened in Aleppo on 
that day from a taxi driver in Damascus, the communication network was that developed.” 
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Hence, word of mouth and snowballing mobilization tactics were the Syrian protesters’ main 
repertoire of contention. In a culture of fear, citizens preferred these conventional, secure methods. 
 
The Role of ICTs in the Diffusion Phase 
 
ICTs did not have a major role in the process of organizing the protests but were essential to 
informing the outside world about them. Slow Internet speed impeded Syrian protesters’ direct connection 
to the outside world. Internet connection was mostly via dial-up connection or a fixed-line telephone 
subscription. Most users were restricted to speeds of only 256 Kbps; hindering multimedia content 
downloads (Freedom House, 2012). The diaspora took an active role in the information stage and secured 
news accessibility (Papadopoulos & Pantti, 2013). Protesters on the ground did mention using the Internet 
to discuss protest logistics and strategies. Mazen Gharibah, a journalist from Homs, said:  
 
We started to create secret groups on Facebook and these groups were called 
“information groups for demonstrations.” They were closed groups. On these pages, we 
said that there would be demonstrations in front of this bank, on this date, so try to be 
there. We took this news and circulated it in trusted circles on the same day. And we got 
ourselves there, that’s how it started. 
 
Mazen’s statements point to the unique methods protesters employed for social media. Instead of 
launching open Facebook pages to interact with millions, they created closed Facebook and Skype groups, 
interacting with friends or friends of friends in these groups. These unique activities were partly due to the 
dissidents’ inexperience with the participative, collaborative nature of digital media, but their creative use 
of ICTs was probably driven more by the cruelty and oppression of the Syrian regime. Compared to the 
well-established Egyptian blogosphere and Twitter users who openly discussed their ideas in Egypt, 
bloggers in Syria could not even openly declare their support for the people’s demands in the country 
(Ghrer, 2013). Using social media was risky, and dissidents were afraid of being caught by the Shabiha 
(armed militia supporting the Ba’ath Party government) while operating the new technologies.  
 
The situation was no different for mobile phone communication. Interviewees in this research 
mentioned that from the start of the uprising, they used secret words when speaking to friends on the 
phone. Dina, for instance, an activist from suburban Damascus, stated: 
 
I had to flee Syria due to an incautious phone conversation with a friend. I was in a 
protest and called a friend from the protest site. My friend was arrested due to our 
phone conversation, and I had to immediately leave the country. When we called people 
from protest sites, we actually put these people in danger.  
 
Dina’s words show how the Moukhabarat, by listening in on certain citizens’ phone calls, easily arrested 
them within hours. 
 
Apart from communication methods such as word of mouth, mobile phones, and the Internet, 
protesters also used traditional communication platforms like coffee shops to organize their protests. 
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Meziane, the leading activist from Hama, mentioned that between March 18 and 25 they met mostly in 
coffee shops during the day to plan the protests. Rather than reaching out via the Internet without 
meeting in person, as would be expected from a 21st-century protest organization, off-line platforms were 
still popular in Syria.  
 
Rinke and Roder (2011) argued that the use of off-line areas and oral communication is 
consistent with Arab communication cultures. Oral communication has a striking advantage in creating the 
resource of trust, necessary for collective action. However, interviews for this study showed that the 
activists used face-to-face communication not just because of their communication culture but also for 
security reasons.  
 
The Organized Collective Action Phase 
 
Deadly clashes between protesters and police in the first month of the protests showed that if the 
protests were to succeed as a sustainable movement, they needed to move beyond local action to a more 
organized campaign (Najm, 2011). In pursuit of this aim, groups that originally formed to organize and 
document local revolutionary activities on the ground were unified at the local coordination committee 
(LCC) level. The first committee emerged in Daraya, a restless suburb of Damascus (Shadid, 2011). 
Osama, a leading dissident in the Daraya protests, described how the local Daraya committee merged 
with the LCC: 
 
The Daraya Local Committee was effective in organizing protests and other peaceful 
activities. Actually, it was founded by a number of leading activists in the city before the 
foundation of the LCC in Syria. When the LCC was established, the Daraya committee 
chose to join it and remained active within it.  
 
In towns and neighborhoods, leading figures like Osama also pioneered oppositional unity. 
Although the committee in Daraya took its power from the street, online platforms loomed large in the 
mobilization and internationalization attempts of LCCs’ members, who organized across disparate regions 
via these tools (Shadid, 2011). Mazen Gharibah, who had helped the Homs Local Committee Council, 
talked about the Internet activities of the LCCs: 
 
Where we were meeting was in the Internet café of a friend. Aside from organizing the 
protests, we were creating logos and banners, drawing some flags, preparing the sprays. 
We also wanted to know what was going on in other cities and how they organized. We 
started to create co-ordination groups on Skype. For example, we contacted local groups 
in Deraa. They told us to use onions when the gas came or not to organize the protests 
from the same mosque.  
 
Mazen’s account describes the improved coordination among different local groups on the ground. 
Approximately 120 local committees emerged across the country. Representatives of these groups started 
to meet fortnightly via Skype to coordinate activities. LCCs became responsible for reporting news and 
developments on the ground to international media. The LCC media office played a significant role at this 
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stage, gathering, verifying, and supplying real-time information about the uprising. It also constantly 
updated the LCC website and Facebook page (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012).  
 
As the protesters became more organized, ICT use and media reporting became increasingly well 
structured. To some extent, this coordination between protesters and new Syrian media agencies 
emerging abroad, such as the Activists News Association and Syrian National Council Media, broke the 
regime’s media blackout. Employees of the Syrian National Council media center said they were in contact 
with activists inside Syria via satellite Internet provided to those activists by the center. As Syrian society 
got used to the developing protest culture, it saw a large increase in citizen journalists, who provided 
information to international media and Syrian-initiated news websites, e-magazines, online radio stations, 
and media centers. Apart from SRFP, various Facebook pages sprang up after the uprising, the most 
prominent being the Syrian Days of Rage, the Shaam News Network, With You Syria and We Are All Martyr 
Hamza Alkhateeb (Almqvist, 2013). All these e-magazines, opposition Web pages, and social media 
groups became both the revolutionaries’ voice and their tools for shaping the protests’ narrative (Harkin, 
2013). Sama, one of the administrators of the We Are All Martyr Hamza Alkhateeb page, said that in the 
absence of social networks, they would all have been killed without anyone noticing. She added: 
 
When I saw how they tortured this innocent child who was trying to deliver milk and 
bread for the children of the besieged city of Deraa, I thought it was our duty to expose 
this crime to the world. 
 
The administrators tried to get the support of the international community by showing the torture 
and other atrocities happening in Syria. As Volkmer (2014) stated, the spread of citizen journalism gives 
way to a process of de-bracketing the society–state nexus. Volkmer (2014) defined the de-bracketing 
process as a characteristic of the transformation of publics that fractures public communication, from 
national mass media spheres to the complex structures of interactive transnational networks. Thus, 
although ICTs were not the main source of Syrian mobilization and organization, they were significant 
players in the creation of interactive transnational networks that informed the world about the protests. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Tracing the development of peaceful protests in Syria shows that specific actors and media came 
to prominence at each stage of the uprising. In the experimental phase, administrators of the SRFP were 
the first actors to try to mitigate the culture of fear amongst Syrians. Along with the Internet, traditional 
media channels played a crucial role during this stage, heightening the prominence of the Facebook page 
and the administrators’ credibility. This finding is corroborated by recent research arguing that the initial 
nuclei of new collective action emerge in the form of online discussion (Gerbaudo, 2012). But despite the 
administrators’ initiation of online discussion in a constructed emotional space, an ill-conceived choice of 
narrative, a restricted time period, and security fears, they failed to reconstruct a sense of togetherness 
and trust in the society. Consequently, their hybrid media activities were insufficient to convince large 
numbers of people to join in the collective action. This finding goes against recent generalizations on Arab 
uprisings that have argued that social media reconstruct a sense of togetherness (Castells, 2012) and 
facilitate gatherings in off-line space (Tufekci & Wilson, 2012). Apparently, people in coercive systems still 
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rarely act on mass media information that is not transmitted through personal ties. The spontaneous 
protest phase in Deraa showed that the presence of social networks, activists’ past protest experience, 
and shared grievances and aspirations in a place were still major elements in forming and sustaining the 
collective identity necessary for the emergence of sustainable collective action. 
 
The organization of protests might be better understood by examining the Friday rallies. This 
study’s findings indicate that leading activists in different cities had an active role in mobilizing the public. 
Snowballing tactics, whereby small mobilization groups galvanized their friends or relatives, were the 
protesters’ main repertoire of contention. Mosques were key to facilitating gatherings and creating a sense 
of “we-ness” in the public sphere. Analysis of protestors’ communication methods reveals that word of 
mouth and face-to-face communication were significant. Interpersonal communication via secret Facebook 
and Skype groups also contributed to the exchange of information and informed the world about the 
situation on the ground. However, the Internet could not be the protesters’ main organizational hub. 
 
The final phase of the peaceful protests supports this research’s hypothesis of a symbiotic 
relation between political culture and the use of ICTs. As protesters developed their protest culture, their 
spontaneous activities increasingly became more organized. Local committees in towns and neighborhoods 
began cooperating with each other and unified under the LCCs. Although the politically inexperienced 
grassroots opposition failed to launch an initiative that harmonized the efforts of political forces (Al-
Monitor, 2013), it efficaciously developed a protest culture in towns and cities. As protesters overcame 
their fears and adapted to the nascent protest culture, they operated more comfortably on the Internet, 
and the number of citizen journalists increased. Eventually they broke free of the regime’s media blackout 
and bypassed the structural limitations via the use of satellite phones and the Internet. Thus, the 
protesters’ hybrid media activities improved in parallel with the activities of developing the political 
culture, de-bracketing the society–state nexus in Syria. 
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